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To Every Remedy a Wrong: The
Confounding, of Civil Liberties
Through Mandatory Arbitration
Clauses in Employment Contracts
by
KATHERINE EDDY*
Introduction
The strange workings of the American media are undeniably
responsible for shaping the lay person's comprehension of the law.
Some may argue that the media is in fact responsible for creating a
certain kind of sophistication among the American public regarding
"sexier" legal issues. From the confusion of the evening news and
courtroom soaps, legal concepts and catchphrases have entered the
American psyche: "innocent until proven guilty," "jury of your
peers," "the right to remain silent," and so on. Certain assumptions
about the law are also communicated by the media and are often
adopted by the American people. Perhaps the most basic of these
assumptions remains that if you are accused of doing something bad,
you can defend yourself in court, and if someone does something bad
to you-you sue 'em. Because these assumptions are presented
outside of their full context, however, they often lead to misguided
ideas concerning a lay person's rights and remedies under a given law.
For instance, it is a basic rule of law that when you affix your
signature to a contract, you attest to having read and understood the
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terms. This rule adds little to a story line regarding workplace sexual
harassment and may be ignored in a TV drama. Thus, a viewer may
become familiar with her statutory right to be free from sexual
harassment in the workplace without understanding that the term-of-
employment contract she signed will ultimately prevent her from
bringing a lawsuit against either her employer or her fellow
employees.
The California Court of Appeal case of 24 Hour Fitness, Inc. v.
Superior Court' illustrates the tragic results of this type of
misunderstanding. Specifically, the plaintiff's view of the facts in 24
Hour Fitness reveals her naive assumptions about the law. Sierra
Munshaw, a young mother who had recently left her job at 24 Hour
Fitness, believed her employer essentially forced her to quit by
ignoring and/or condoning the inappropriate and offensive behavior2
of her fellow employees and supervisors. 3 Ms. Munshaw took her
grievance to a lawyer who, after a year of aimless negotiations, filed
suit against 24 Hour Fitness and the numerous employees who
allegedly had harassed and assaulted Ms. Munshaw. 4 The trial court
felt that Ms. Munshaw had a case, and denied the defendants'
motions for summary judgement.5 When the defendants appealed the
decision, Ms. Munshaw received the news that the defendants would
not be required to face her in court.
As part of the paperwork she had filled out to begin working for
24 Hour Fitness, Ms. Munshaw had signed an agreement to arbitrate
any dispute arising from her employment.6 Workplace sexual
harassment in violation of California law occurs, by its very nature,
during the course of employment. "Harassment of an employee...
by an employee other than an agent or supervisor shall be unlawful if
the entity, or its agents or supervisors, knows or should have known
of this conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective
1. 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 533 (Ct. App. 1998).
2. Munshaw made allegations against eight defendants in their individual capacities
as well as against her employer, 24 Hour Fitness. She claimed that she was repeatedly
made the recipient of verbal sexual comments as well as offensive physical touching, all of
which she detailed specifically in her complaint. Pl.'s Compl. at 10-11, 24 Hour Fitness,
Inc. v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 533 (Ct. App. 1998) (No. 213868) [hereinafter
Complaint].
3. Id. at 6-8.
4. Letter from Henry Lederman, Partner, Littler Mendelson, P.C., to John J. Turi,
Counsel for Plaintiff (July 19,1996).
5. 24 Hour Fitness, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 535.
6. Id. at 535-36.
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action."'7 This statute has been amended to impose strict liability on
companies when the harassing is done by an agent or supervisor. 8
Consequently, the language of the arbitration clause was interpreted
to cover Munshaw's co-workers in their individual status because they
were acting within the scope of their employment.9 The court of
appeal reversed the trial court's finding and granted summary
judgement for all but one defendant. The appellate court then
interpreted a sentence in a letter written by Munshaw's attorney to
mean that Munshaw had waived her right to arbitration.10 Step by
step, the court of appeal eliminated Munshaw's possible rights to a
remedy for the wrongs she alleged."
Ms. Munshaw had assumed that she had an American's right to a
trial. But, in fact, no one can trust that assumption when mandatory
pre-dispute arbitration clauses enter the picture. A split between the
Ninth Circuit and California state courts in interpreting civil rights
statutes serves further to highlight the need for reform in the law
regarding mandatory arbitration clauses and employment
discrimination claims.12 Indeed, the contrast between the Ninth
Circuit's landmark finding that mandatory arbitration clauses are
inapplicable to Title VII claims in Duffield v. Robertson Stephens &
Co.13 and the California Court of Appeal's decision to enforce a
mandatory arbitration clause in 24 Hour Fitness is a particularly stark
one.
This Note will look at the differences between these two cases
and will directly address the consequences of the decision made by
the California Court of Appeal in 24 Hour Fitness. Part I of this Note
provides a background regarding mandatory arbitration clauses in
employment contracts and examines the Ninth Circuit's rationale in
declaring such clauses invalid. Part II advances three criticisms of the
California Court of Appeal's decision in 24 Hour Fitness. First, the
court's decision to grant summary judgment to the defendants based
7. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940(h)(1) (West 2001).
8. Id.
9. 24 Hour Fitness, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 538-39.
10. Id at 536 ("In a letter sent to Nautilus's counsel after filing the complaint,
Munshaw's attorney expressly repudiated the arbitration agreement.").
11. Id. at 542 n.12.
12. Note that the split between federal and state law may encourage forum shopping
among plaintiffs with mandatory arbitration clauses who are also alleging discrimination,
despite the fact that FEHA is generally considered to be a more plaintiff-friendly statute.
E.g., Cynthia L. Sands, Practice Tips: State and Federal Enforcement of Arbitration After
Duffield, 21 L.A. LAW. 18,24 (1998).
13. 144 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 1998).
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on plaintiff's waiver of her arbitration rights impedes fair access to
the courts. Second, the third party beneficiary theory which entitled
the individual defendants to arbitration rights under the contract,
despite the fact that-they were not parties to the contract, resulted in
an unintended relinquishment of rights that was not within Ms.
Munshaw's reasonable expectations. Third, the court did not look at
the overall circumstances when assessing the unconscionability of
enforcing this clause. Part III argues that the reasoning in 24 Hour
Fitness may severely impede Californians' access to the courts when
their civil rights are violated and proposes a compromise between 24
Hour Fitness and Duffield that would better serve the expectations of
both parties in disputes over mandatory arbitration clauses in
employment contracts.
I. Background to the Decision in 24 Hour Fitness, Ina v.
Superior Court
A. An Overview of the Use of Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in
Employment Contracts
Distinguishing between two different types of arbitration
agreements is essential to understanding the court's interpretation of
Congress' intent in Duffield.14 One type of arbitration agreement is a
post-dispute agreement, which is reached between two parties after
the events leading to a claim have already occurred. This type of
agreement has many advantages and is less problematic than other
types of arbitration agreements.' 5 First, it is likely that both parties
will have some type of legal counsel once a dispute has arisen and
litigation is being contemplated.16 Second, both parties understand
the nature of the claim and can weigh the costs and benefits of
litigation versus arbitration.'7 Third, parties are placed into relatively
equal bargaining positions because the party wishing to arbitrate and
avoid court proceedings must forfeit something to convince the other
party to agree.18
These elements, which help to guarantee the effectiveness of
post-dispute arbitration, are rarely present or contemplated in a
14. Id at 1193.
15. Joseph R. Grodin, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims: Doctrine
and Policy in the Wake of Gilmer, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1, 28-29 (1996).
16. Id. at 29.
17. Id.
18. Id.
[Vol. 52HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
MANDATORY ARBITRATION CLAUSES
second type of arbitration clause: the mandatory arbitration
agreement.' 9  Increasingly popular as a term in employment
contracts,20 the mandatory arbitration clause (also called a pre-
dispute arbitration clause or a term-of-employment clause) is often
included in an employee handbook or as part of the paperwork a new
employee is required to sign in order to begin work.21 In this type of
agreement, the employee waives his rights to litigate future claims
against the employer as a condition to obtaining employment.22
Employers generally are sure to make the terms of a mandatory
arbitration clause mutually binding and to use broad language in
order to cover any potential claim.23 Because it is understood that
employees seldom read or question the terms of their employment
contracts,24 these' clauses are often cross-referenced in several
documents that incoming employees must read and sign in order to
increase their visibility.25
Employers include mandatory arbitration clauses in employment
contracts for a variety of reasons. Many employers, for example, view
these clauses as merely pre-determined forum selection clauses
utilized to avoid time-consuming disputes about the appropriate
venue for a trial.26 Others are concerned about the many types of
claims even the most conscientious employer might face in court,27
19. Id
20. See Gina K. Janeiro, Balancing Efficiency and Justice: In Support of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission's Policy Statement Regarding Mandatory
Arbitration and Employment Contracts, 7 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 125, 127
nn.14-15 (1999) (outlining statistics and studies which illustrate the rising trend of
mandatory arbitration clauses as preconditions to employment); see also William H.
Daughtrey and Donnie L. Kidd, Jr., Modifications Necessary for Commercial Arbitration
Law to Protect Statutory Rights Against Discrimination in Employment: A Discussion and
Proposals for Change, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 29,31 (1998).
21. William M. Howard, Arbitrating Employment Discrimination Claims: Do You
Really Have To? Do You Really Want To?, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 255,283 (1994) (describing
different mandatory arbitration agreement policies).
22. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1187.
23. See Evan J. Spelfogel, Mandatory Arbitration vs. Employment Litigation, 54 DIsP.
RESOL. J. 78, 80 (1999).
24. Janeiro, supra note 20, at 126.
25. See Spelfogel, supra note 23, at 80.
26. See Howard, supra note 21, at 282-83 (describing the elements of effective
arbitration clauses).
27. See, e.g., Robert J. Lewton, Comment Are Mandatory, Binding Arbitration
Requirements a Viable Solution for Employers Seeking to Avoid Litigating Statutory
Employment Discrimination Claims?, 59 ALB. L. REv. 991, 993 (1996) (linking the
increasing use of mandatory arbitration clauses to the rising costs of defending
employment discrimination claims); Michael R. Holden, Note, Arbitration of State-Law
Claims by Employees: An Argument for Containing Federal Arbitration Law, 80
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particularly given the large sums that may be awarded to plaintiffs by
sympathetic juries.28
But mandatory arbitration clauses create a variety of legal
problems and public policy concerns. Specifically, the problem with
requiring mandatory arbitration as a condition of employment is that
the procedures, rights, and remedies available in an arbitration
proceeding can differ greatly from those available in a judicial
forum.29 When two parties agree to arbitrate a dispute that has
already arisen, it can be assumed that both parties have contemplated
the benefits and detriments of arbitration to their particular claims
and defenses.30 However, an employee who has signed on to a pre-
dispute agreement has almost certainly not made the same inquiries
regarding the differences inherent in the arbitration process.
Professor Joseph Grodin attacks the issue:
Before a dispute arises, it is impossible for a party to assess
precisely what is being waived and the probable effect of the
waiver-even if his or her attention is focused on the issue. In the
employment context this is especially a problem for the employee;
while the employer can take into account statistical probabilities
affecting all its employees, the employee's ability to predict what
may happen to him or her individually is beyond the scope of such
analysis.31
Concededly, both parties gain some advantages by participating in
arbitration; the most commonly noted benefit is that it is more
efficient and less costly than litigation.3 2 However, the disadvantages
to an employee alleging discrimination or harassment are numerous,
and often not readily apparent.
These disadvantages include the problem of limited discovery in
employment discrimination cases which can be particularly onerous
since the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show discrimination 33
Another major disadvantage to employee-plaintiffs is the lack of
diversity among the arbitrators from which the employee may
CORNELL L. REv. 1695, 1701-02 (1995) (citing the changing nature of at-will employment
as one reason that employers are requiring arbitration clauses as conditions to
employment).
28. See Spelfogel, supra note 23, at 78 (noting that the average jury award in a
wrongful termination case is $700,000, with many awards in the millions).
29. Howard, supra note 21, at 287-88.
30. Grodin, supra note 15, at 29.
31. Id.
32. See Spelfogel, supra note 23, at 78; but see Lewton, supra note 27, at 996
(concluding that employers may find arbitration just as expensive, time-consuming, and
disruptive as litigation due to the current unsettled state of the law).
33. Howard, supra note 21, at 287.
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choose.34 Of the 50,000 arbitrators on the American Arbitration
Association panels, only 6% are women.35 Additionally, the results in
an arbitration proceeding can be particularly unpredictable because
arbitrators are not bound to follow case law.36 In a worst-case
scenario, the limited right to review of an arbitration decision can
further prejudice the system against a plaintiff in employment
discrimination cases because a plaintiff who receives unfair treatment
in arbitration is stuck with the decision made by the biased
arbitrator.3 7  Recognizing these disadvantages, both the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission and the National Labor
Relations Board have announced opposition to mandatory
arbitration of employment discrimination claims, specifically when
employment is conditioned on the signing of the arbitration clause.3
8
Employers, however, have good reason to favor defending
disputes before an arbitrator rather than a jury. The number of
employment discrimination cases is twenty-five times greater than the
number filed thirty years ago.3 9 Plaintiff are estimated to win nearly
70% of the 25,000 wrongful discharge and discrimination cases filed
in state and federal courts nationwide, with the average jury award at
approximately $700,000.40  As a consequence, the number of
companies choosing to require mandatory arbitration of employee
disputes is on the rise.41 Virtually nothing impedes an employer from
making this choice-employers may simply insert clauses into the
employment contract, and employees can either take it as a term of
employment or find work elsewhere.
B. Statutory Preclusion of Mandatory Arbitration: The Ninth Circuit's
Decision in Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co.
Employers relying on mandatory arbitration clauses in
employment contracts to avoid lawsuits by their employees have
reason to be concerned over the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Duffield v.
Robertson Stephens & Co.42 In that case, the Ninth Circuit found that
34. Victoria J. Craine, Note, The Mandatory Arbitration Clause: Forum Selection or
Employee Coercion?, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. LJ. 537,550 (1999).
35. Id.
36. Ik at 551.
37. Howard, supra note 21, at 287-88.
38. H. WARREN KNIGHT ET AL., CAL. PRAC. GUIDE ALT. DISP. RES. Ch. 5-E,
5:246.5-5:246.10 (1992-1998).
39. Spelfogel, supra note 23, at 78.
40. Id.
41. Janeiro, supra note 20, at 137.
42. 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998).
MANDATORY ARBITRATION CLAUSESMarch 2001]
the 1991 Amendments to the Civil Rights Act prohibits mandatory
arbitration of discrimination claims.43
The court's finding in Duffield was based on language in the
Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp.,44 a case traditionally used by courts to enforce agreements to
arbitrate discrimination claims. 45 There, the Court ruled that parties
should be held to their bargain to arbitrate Title VII claims "unless
Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of
judicial remedies. '46 If Congress had intended to preclude a waiver
of a judicial forum for Title VII claims, it would be apparent in the
text of the act, its legislative history, or an inherent conflict between
arbitration and the act's underlying purposes.47 In Duffield, the Ninth
Circuit found sufficient evidence that Congress had intended to
preclude a waiver of these rights to meet the standard outlined in
Gilmer.48 In looking at the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Ninth Circuit
determined that Congress had spoken to the issue of alternative
dispute resolution, in section 118.49 Section 118 reads:
Where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of
alternative means of dispute resolutions including settlement
negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation, fact-finding,
minitrials, and arbitration is encouraged to resolve disputes arising
under the Acts of provisions of Federal law amended by this Title.50
The Duffield court made a connection between the language of
section 118 and the overall intention of the 1991 amendments. It
noted that the list in section 118 includes only types of alternative
dispute resolution agreed to once a dispute has arisen5' and that
Congress' directive was to read Title VII broadly so as to best
effectuate its remedial purposes.52 Moreover, the Act's legislative
history revealed Congress' primary intent to strengthen existing
protections and remedies available to employees bringing
discrimination claims. 53 Because Congress' intent was to make it
43. Id. at 1185.
44. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
45. Id. at 27.
46. Id. at 26 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 628 (1985)).
47. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
48. Duffleld, 144 F.3d at 1195.
49. Ild. at 1193 n.21.
50. Pub. L. 102-166, § 216, at 97, reprinted in notes to 42 U.S.C. §1981.
51. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1193 n.13.
52. Id. at 1192.
53. Id. at 1193.
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easier for plaintiffs to remedy Title VII violations in the courtroom
with relaxed standards and allowance for damages,54 the Ninth Circuit
concluded that Congress did not intend to endorse pre-dispute
arbitration agreements. 55
The Ninth Circuit has subsequently been clear about
congressional intent as it relates to arbitrating Title VII claims.
"Congress intended there to be at least a knowing agreement to
arbitrate employment disputes before an employee may be deemed
to have waived the comprehensive statutory rights, remedies, and
procedural protections prescribed in Title VII and related state
statutes. '56 However, despite the Ninth Circuit's determination to
impose these types of knowing consent requirements on contracting
parties, California state courts have repeatedly denied the need for
such requirements.5 7
H. The Effect of Ignoring Duffield: Problems with the
California Court of Appeal's Decision in 24 Hour Fitness v.
Superior Court
A. Impeding Fair Access to the Courts by Granting Summary Judgment In
Lieu of a Motion to Compel
The most important victory for employers in 24 Hour Fitness was
the appellate court's willingness to grant summary judgement based
on the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate while confirming
that Ms. Munshaw had waived her right to arbitrate. In a phone
interview, Henry Lederman, lead counsel for 24 Hour Fitness, shared
his thoughts on his success in 24 Hour Fitness.58 Lederman stated that
he had successfully argued for summary judgement in similar
arbitration cases in Contra Costa and Alameda Counties. Sonoma
County Superior Court, where Munshaw filed her complaint, was the
first trial court to offer resistance to his persuasive rendering of the
decisions in Charles J. Rounds Co. v. Joint Council of Teamsters No.
4259 and Christensen v. Dewor Developments.60 Given this resistance,
54. Id at 1191 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 40(I) at 30; H.R. Rep. No. 40(11) at 1-4, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. 78 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694,694-96).
55. Id. at 1193.
56. Lee v. Tech. Integration Group, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 387, 390 (Ct. App. 1999) (quoting
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299,1304 (9th Cir. 1994)).
57. Id at 392.
58. Telephone Interview with Henry Lederman, Partner at Littler Mendelson, P.C.,
(Feb. 28, 2000) [hereinafter Interview].
59. 484 P.2d 1397 (Cal. 1971).
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Lederman's client supported the filing of a peremptory writ in an
effort to reverse the trial court's decision to deny summary
judgement. The appeal proved fruitful; the court of appeal reversed
the trial court's denial of summary judgment as to all but one of the
defendants. Lederman's client had successfully avoided both a costly
trial as well as the potential risks of an arbitration award for the
plaintiff, who was found to have repudiated her right to arbitration in
an earlier letter to counsel.
When questioned about the massive requests for depublication
of 24 Hour Fitness, Lederman speculated that plaintiffs' attorneys felt
emboldened by the Ninth Circuit's decision in Duffield.61 Prior to
Duffield, California courts had consistently enforced mandatory
arbitration clauses covering claims arising under California's Fair
Employment and Housing Act (FEHA).62  Duffield, however,
specifically linked FEHA claims to Title VII claims in finding neither
of them subject to pre-dispute arbitration agreements. In a footnote,
the Ninth Circuit in Duffield indicated that "'because parallel state
anti-discrimination laws are explicitly made part of Title VII's
enforcement scheme,' FEHA claims are arbitrable to the same extent
as Title VII claims." 63 Nevertheless, three months after the decision
in Duffield was handed down, 24 Hour Fitness unequivocally
reaffirmed California's position, stating that the decision of the Ninth
Circuit was not binding or even persuasive on California state courts.
The court of appeal in 24 Hour Fitness dismissed Duffield in a
footnote: "We reject Munshaw's suggestion at oral argument that her
FEHA claim is rendered nonarbitrable by Duffield ... Duffield is not
binding on this court."64
Instead, most California courts base their findings regarding
mandatory arbitration clauses on the language of California Civil
Procedure, section 1281. A written agreement to submit a
"controversy thereafter arising is valid, enforceable and irrevocable,
save upon such grounds as exist for the revocation of any contract."65
The provisions within a contract are considered to bind the parties,
60. 661 P.2d 1088 (Cal. 1983).
61. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55.
62. Spellman v. Sec., Annuities & Ins. Servs., Inc., 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 427, 433 (Ct. App.
1992).
63. Duffield, 144 F.3d. at 1187 n.3 (quoting Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299,
1303 n.1 (9th Cir. 1994)).
64. 24 Hour Fitness, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 539 n.9.
65. CAL. Civ. PROC. § 1281 (West 1982).
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whether or not the agreement was read or understood by a party.66 In
Prudential Insurance Co. v. Lai, the Ninth Circuit required that the
relinquishment of statutory rights under an arbitration clause be
"knowing and voluntary." 67 However, the California courts appeared
to reject the "knowing and voluntary" requirement in Brookwood v.
Bank of America.68 Moreover, the state's legislative intent in enacting
FEHA has never included an intent to preclude waiver of those
statutory rights.69
The predominant practical impact of 24 Hour Fitness has been to
restrict potential recourse of plaintiffs wishing to dispute the validity
of their arbitration clauses. 70 Prior to the decision in 24 Hour Fitness
the common practice of a defense attorney seeking to enforce
arbitration clauses in employment contracts was to file a motion to
compel arbitration.7' As discussed above, Henry Lederman
pioneered a defense strategy that challenged that scenario.72 Two
California Supreme Court cases were particularly instrumental in
forming this strategy. In Rounds v. Joint Counsel of Teamsters No.
42, the court affirmed the dismissal of an employer's action against a
union when the dispute was covered by a contractual arbitration
clause.73 In Christensen v. Dewor Developments, plaintiffs who had
filed suit in bad faith were held to have waived their right to
contractual arbitration.74 By combining the holdings in Rounds and
Christensen, Lederman had convinced trial courts in several counties
that plaintiffs pursuing litigation despite a valid arbitration clause had
waived their right to arbitration, thus entitling the defendant to
summary judgment. The trial court in Sonoma County, where
Munshaw filed her complaint, was the first court to offer resistance to
Lederman's persuasive rendering of the decisions in Rounds and
66. Brookwood v. Bank of Am., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 515, 520 (Ct. App. 1996) (citing
Macaulay v. Norlander, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 204,207 (Ct. App. 1992)).
67. Prudential, 42 F.3d at 1305.
68. 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 519.
69. Sands, supra note 12, at 21-22 (discussing the absence of language regarding
arbitration or waiver in the legislative history of FEHA).
70. Interview, supra note 58.
71. See, e.g., Davis v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 79, 81 (Ct. App. 1997);
Wilder v. Whittaker Corp., 215 Cal. Rptr. 536,538 (Ct. App. 1985); Bertrero v. Nat'l Gen.
Corp., 529 P.2d 608, 613 (Cal. 1974).
72. Interview, supra note 58.
73. 484 P.2d 1399,1404 (Cal. 1971).
74. 661 P.2d 1088,1094 (Cal. 1983) (holding that plaintiff had waived arbitration when,
as a tactic to obtain discovery from defendant, plaintiff filed a complaint and proceeded
with pre-trial motions).
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Christensen.75 As a consequence, Lederman's strategy was heard-
and adopted-by a California Court of Appeal.
Rounds outlines three courses a defendant might follow when
the only issues litigated are covered by the arbitration clause: it can
litigate, compel arbitration, or move for summary judgment "on the
ground that the plaintiff has failed to exhaust arbitration remedies." 76
The Court in Christensen re-affirmed three factors from its decisions
in prior caselaw:7 7 "The relevant factors include whether the party
seeking arbitration (1) has 'previously taken steps inconsistent with
an intent to invoke arbitration,' (2) 'has unreasonably delayed in
seeking arbitration,' (3) or has acted in 'bad faith' or with 'willful
misconduct."' 78  The court of appeal in 24 Hour Fitness accepted
defense counsel's argument for summary judgement based on
Rounds.79 An understanding of the ramifications of its action is found
in the court's final footnote: "We recognize the result of our decision
here is that Munshaw has no avenue for recourse against Nautilus,80
Rodriguez, Harmon or Cunningham. This consequence flows from
her decision to repudiate the arbitration agreement. 81
According to Lederman, the effect has definitely been felt by the
legal community.82 Prior to 24 Hour Fitness, a potential plaintiff who
had signed an arbitration clause might pursue a complaint in court
and leave arbitration as a fallback remedy. After 24 Hour Fitness,
plaintiffs' attorneys are far less willing to take a chance in court. The
75. Order Den. Mots. for Summ. J. or Summ. Adjudication, 24 Hour Fitness, Inc. v.
Superior Court, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 533 (Ct. App. 1998) (No. 213868).
76. Rounds, 484 P.2d at 1398.
77. E.g., Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1204-1205 (Cal. 1982); Davis v.
Blue Cross, 600 P.2d 1060,1064 (1979).
78. Keating, 645 P.2d at 1204 (quoting Davis, 600 P.2d at 1064).
79. Note that the court did not reach the question of whether Munshaw had implicitly
waived her right to arbitrate by filing suit, because it found that she had expressly
repudiated her right to arbitration in a letter from her counsel. The context of the letter
makes the so-called repudiation questionable. The letter addresses the deposition of one
of the defendants in relation to the facts of Christensen, and then states "Here, plaintiffs
are knowingly waiving their right to arbitrate, and are not reversing their position." It is
unclear from the context of the statement (sandwiched between two comments regarding
the plaintiffs in Christensen) whether "here" refers to "in Christensen" or to the pending
case. The use of the plural "plaintiffs" and "their" to refer to the single plaintiff Munshaw
makes the repudiating statement even more suspect. However, nowhere in the record
does plaintiff attempt to explain or deny the statement made in the December 5, 1996
letter. (Record on file with author).
80. The names "Nautilus" and "24 Hour Fitness" are used interchangeably in the
opinions and pleadings. Except for when used in a direct quote, this paper will use "24
Hour Fitness" to refer to the defendant corporation.
81. 24 Hour Fitness, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 542 n.12.
82. Interview, supra note 58.
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case has clearly strengthened pre-dispute arbitration clauses by
making litigation an all-or-nothing proposition for a plaintiff
questioning its rights under the arbitration clause.83
Because 24 Hour Fitness involved an express repudiation of the
arbitration agreement, it is hard to know for certain whether
California courts will find a waiver of arbitration in every case where
a party has failed to pursue arbitration before suing. Consistently
substituting summary judgement for a motion to compel arbitration
would have a harsh effect on plaintiffs, particularly in employment
cases where the arbitration clause is part of an adhesion contract.
There is some indication that courts do not intend this effect. An
agreement to arbitrate is favored by courts and there exists a heavy
burden on the moving party to establish waiver.84 In general, it is
held that the moving party's mere participation in litigation is not
enough; the party who seeks to establish waiver must show that some
prejudice has resulted from the other party's delay in seeking
arbitration.85 However, the language and results in Christensen,
Rounds, and 24 Hour Fitness have made some plaintiffs unwilling to
take that risk.
B. The Right of Non-Signatories to Enforce an Arbitration Clause in an
Employment Contract
One of the strangest results of 24 Hour Fitness was the catch-22
experienced by the plaintiff in her attempts to bring charges in court
against her fellow employees. She found that her efforts to improve
her chances of success against her employer limited her ability to
successfully sue her coworkers. In order to hold the employer strictly
liable for sexual harassment damages under FEHA, a plaintiff must
show that the harasser was acting in his supervisory capacity.
86
Otherwise, an employer is held to a negligence standard in its liability
for employee-employee harassment.87 Thus, a plaintiff generally
benefits from being able to show that it was her supervisors who
engaged in the harassing behavior. Accordingly, Munshaw declared
in her complaint that each individually named defendant "was acting
within the scope of his managerial authority" when the alleged
83. Lederman notes that as far as he is concerned, employees who feel the arbitration
agreement they have signed is invalid are entitled to seek declaratory relief without risking
a waiver of their right to arbitrate. Interview, supra note 58.
84. Davis, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 82.
85. I& at 83 (following Keating, 645 P.2d at 1204).
86. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940(h)(1) (West 2001).
87. Id
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misconduct took place.88 Seeking to avoid a strict liability standard,
24 Hour Fitness replied that "the alleged misconduct of Nautilus
employees did not occur during or within the scope or course of their
employment with Nautilus. '89
At the trial level, this word play and posturing seemed to be
nothing more than everyday trial attorney maneuvers. 90 According to
the unpublished Order Denying Motions for Summary Judgment or
Summary Adjudication at the trial level of 24 Hour Fitness, the
individual employees' eligibility to demand arbitration of Munshaw's
claims against them was a question of fact not covered by the
arbitration clause.91 The trial court determined that there were
"issues raised by the complaint and answer that are not covered by
the arbitration agreement, nor susceptible to arbitration." 92
Specifically, the court ruled that the questions of whether the
individual defendants were employees of 24 Hour Fitness and
whether they were acting within the scope of their employment were
not covered by the arbitration agreement. Additionally, it stated that
the moving parties had not met their burden of showing that all issues
raised in the complaint were covered by the arbitration agreement
"or that all parties have signed and are bound by the agreement." 93
Consequently, the trial court denied the defendants' motion for
summary judgment.
88. Complaint, supra note 2, at 3-4.
89. Answer of Def. 24 Hour Fitness, Inc., 24 Hour Fitness, Inc. v. Superior Court, 78
Cal. Rptr. 2d 533 (Ct. App. 1998) (No. 213868) [hereinafter Answer].
90. Later in the proceedings, the parties switched positions when it became more
apparent that employees "acting within the scope of employment" would be protected by
the arbitration clause in the contract. Plaintiff attempted to avoid the effect of her original
allegations by saying the incidents in the complaint occurred while she was acting within
the scope of her employment, but while the defendants were not. Defendants did not
retract their original statement, but instead made use of caselaw supporting an employee's
ability to benefit from his employer's arbitration agreements and relied on the argument
that the language of the arbitration clause required Munshaw to arbitrate any claim arising
from her employment. This argument, carried out to its natural conclusion, is ridiculous.
For example, defendants suggest that "the language of the agreement... is not limited
simply to disputes between Nautilus and Munshaw." Rather, the language covers any
dispute that arises from Munshaw's employment. Following from this argument is the
bizarre consequence that any employee, customer, or stranger from off the street whose
conduct resulted in a dispute involving Munshaw would have a right to claim the benefits
of the arbitration contract between Munshaw and 24 Hour Fitness.
91. Order Den. Mots. for Summ. J. or Summ. Adjudication at 2,24 Hour Fitness, Inc.
v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 533 (Ct. App. 1998) (No. 213868).
92. Id.
93. Id.
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The court of appeal, however, reversed the trial court's ruling by
allowing the employee defendants to rely on allegations in the
plaintiff s complaint to form a factual basis for their motion.94
Because her complaint asserted that each individual defendant was
"employed in a position by 24 Hour NAUTILUS [sic] as a manager
and an authorized agent.., and was acting within the scope of his
managerial authority," 95 the individual defendants were deemed by
the court to have met their burden of proving their third party
beneficiary status.96 This ruling was founded on the principle set
forth in Pinewood Investors v. City of Oxnard97 which states that
parties seeking summary judgment can rely on admissions of material
fact made in the opposing party's pleadings.98 The court found that
Munshaw's allegations constituted admissions of fact99 in the absence
of any countervailing evidence.1°°
The inclusion of these allegations in the original complaint seems
to be aimed at holding 24 Hour Fitness financially liable for the acts
of its "agents and employees."'' 1 Identical allegations of supervisory
capacity appear after the introduction of each individual defendant,
giving that section of the complaint the appearance of a boilerplate
form for allegations of discrimination and harassment.1' 2 However,
the court of appeal was not required to look at the intention or
knowledge of the plaintiff making the allegations. 10 3 Instead, a
defendant is entitled to rely on allegations made in the complaint as
statements of fact in a motion for summary judgement.1°4
Having determined that all defendants, with one possible
exception,10 5 were acting as agents of 24 Hour Fitness, the court of
94. 24 Hour Fitness, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 539-40.
95. See Complaint, supra note 2, at 3-5.
96. 24 Hour Fitness, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 539-40.
97. 184 Cal. Rptr. 417 (Ct. App. 1982).
98. ld. at 419-20.
99. 24 Hour Fitness, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 539.
100. See Golden W. Baseball Co. v. Talley, 284 Cal. Rptr. 53, 60 (Ct. App. 1991).
101. See id
102. See id.
103. 24 Hour Fitness, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 539.
104. See Pinewood Investors v. City of Oxnard, 184 Cal. Rptr. 417,420 (Ct. App. 1982).
105. Defendant Hamilton had made admissions, either as answers to interrogatories or
in deposition, wherein he admitted that if the harassment did in fact take place at all, it
had taken place at his apartment and therefore not within the scope of his employment.
24 Hour Fitness, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 540. He was the only defendant who did not receive
the benefit of the arbitration clause, and, accordingly, summary judgment. Id. However,
plaintiff's case against Hamilton could not include a sexual harassment claim in his
individual capacity. The parties apparently settled.
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appeal turned to the California Supreme Court's ruling in Dryer v.
Los Angeles Rams.0 6 In Dryer, plaintiff asserted that four individual
defendants were not entitled to the benefit of the arbitration clause
he had signed with the defendant corporation.' °7 However, the
plaintiff specifically alleged in his complaint that the defendants were
being sued in their capacity as owners, operators, and managing
agents of the corporation in question (the Los Angeles Rams).108 He
additionally stated that each of the individual defendants was a party
to the contract, and that each breached the contract.10 9 From these
allegations, the Dryer court concluded that "if, as the complaint
alleges, the individual defendants, though not signatories, were acting
as agents for the Rams, then they are entitled to the benefit of the
arbitration provisions."" 0 The court referred to other California
court cases reflecting the same proposition."'
The Dryer court appears to stress the importance of the facts of
the case to its ruling. It prefaces the discussion of agency with the
following statement: "Given the facts and the procedural posture of
this case, this ruling [of the trial court, denying individual defendants
the benefit of arbitration] yields bizarre results.""12 The plaintiff in
Dryer had made direct reference to specific, determinable facts about
the individual defendants' status as "agents" of the signatory to the
arbitration clause.113 He additionally alleged that the individual
defendants were parties to the contract and that they breached the
contract containing the arbitration clause." 4
Despite the court of appeal's ruling, the specific facts of Dryer
are clearly distinguishable from 24 Hour Fitness. To begin with, the
claim" 5 in Dryer is a breach of contract claim, whereas the
centerpiece of 24 Hour Fitness is sexual harassment." 6 The extent to
which these two different claims involve individuals as well as
corporations greatly differs, because a sexual harassment case directly
implicates the actions of individuals. Furthermore, the two cases are
distinguished in the types of proof offered by the parties. In 24 Hour
106. 24 Hour Fitness, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 539.
107. Dryer v. Los Angeles Rams, 709 P.2d 826, 833-34 (Cal. 1985).
108. Id. at 833.
109. Id. at 833-34.
110. Id. at 834.
111. See 24 Hour Fitness, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 539.
112. Dryer, 709 P.2d at 833 (emphasis added).
113. Id
114. Id at 833-34.
115. Id at 827.
116. 24 Hour Fitness, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 536.
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Fitness, the plaintiff makes boilerplate assertions about the nature of
the individual defendants' agency.1 7 At no time does she allege that
the individual defendants are parties to the employment contract that
was signed by herself and 24 Hour Fitness, or that they breached that
contract." 8 Indeed, 24 Hour Fitness specifically states in its answer to
Munshaw's complaint, "the alleged misconduct of Nautilus employees
did not occur during or within the scope of course of their
employment with Nautilus."" 9 Although a defendant's allegations
are inconsequential to the issue of what the court can consider as fact,
the direct rebuttal of Munshaw's proposition serves to distinguish the
facts of this case from the undisputed agency of the defendants in
Dryer.20
Other strong arguments for denying the individual defendants'
third party standing were not raised. For instance, courts generally
hold a presumption against third party standing, especially when
there has been no express agreement between the contracting parties
to benefit the third party.12' "A party cannot establish third party
beneficiary status unless he or she carries the burden of proving that
the contracting parties' intended purpose in executing their
agreement was to confer a direct benefit on the alleged third party
beneficiary."'' 2 In California, the intent to benefit the third party
need not be manifested by the promisor; it is sufficient that the intent
is understood between the parties. 123 Neither is it necessary that the
contract identify or refer to the third party beneficiary by name; the
beneficiary may recover' 24 if he or she can show that it was intended
that he or she be benefited by the contract.'25 However, California
courts do require at least that the promisor have reason to know of
the promisee's intent to benefit a third party. 26
117. Complaint, supra note 2, at 3-5.
118. See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 2.
119. See Answer, supra note 89, at 2.
120. Dryer, 709 P.2d at 834.
121. Harry G. Prince, Perfecting the Third Party Beneficiary Standing Rule Under
Section 302 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 25 B.C. L. REv. 919, 926 (1984).
122. Alling v. Universal Mfg. Corp., 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 718,735-36 (Ct. App. 1992)(finding,
in part, that a corporation not in existence at the time the contract was made could not be
a third party beneficiary to the arbitration clause therein).
123. Ild. at 736.
124. Here, the potential beneficiaries of the employment contract did not wish to
recover any claim. Instead, they wanted to use the protection of the arbitration clause
between Munshaw and 24 Hour Fitness to avoid a lawsuit. 24 Hour Fitness, 78 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 539.
125. Ailing, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 736.
126. Prince, supra note 121, at 931.
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But because the court accepted Munshaw's allegations regarding
third party beneficiary status for the individual defendants as fact, it
did not analyze the parties' intent when making their contract for
employment. 27 Munshaw was never able to argue that she did not
have reason to know that her co-workers would be third party
beneficiaries. Employees have traditionally been unsuccessful in
claiming third party standing on their employers' contracts. 28 Even
when the potential benefit of the contract would be substantial, courts
have based their decisions on the fact that the contract was primarily
made to benefit the employer.2 9 Clearly, these types of arguments
could have furthered Munshaw's cause and her lawyers failed her by
not making them.
C. The Ultimate Unconscionability of This Mandatory Arbitration Clause
Munshaw claimed that her employment contract was an
unconscionable contract of adhesion. Indeed, the type of contract
signed by Munshaw is typically considered a contract of adhesion.
Contracts of adhesion are standardized contracts which are drafted by
the party with superior bargaining strength and submitted on a "take
it or leave it" basis.130 Generally, these types of contracts are fully
enforceable against the weaker party.131 However, the contract is
unenforceable if "it is unconscionable and does not fall within the
reasonable expectations of the weaker or 'adhering' party.' 1 32
The court in 24 Hour Fitness reviewed the criteria for
unconscionability of an arbitration clause, but did not give the facts of
this case a full review. 33 Both a procedural and a substantive element
must be present to render a contract invalid for unconscionability.134
Procedural unconscionability focuses on the oppressive nature arising
from an inequality of bargaining power and a lack of meaningful
choice in the terms of the contract, 135 as well as the extent to which
the disputed terms were "hidden" within the printed form. 3 6
California courts have had trouble evaluating substantive
127. 24 Hour Fitness, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 539.
128. Prince, supra note 121, at 948.
129. Id. at 949.
130. Howard, supra note 21, at 266-67.
131. Id. at 267.
132. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 255, 263 (Ct.
App. 1998).
133. See 24 Hour Fitness, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 540-41.
134. Id. at 540.
135. Stirlen v. Supercuts Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138,145 (Ct. App. 1992).
136. 24 Hour Fitness, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 540-41.
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unconscionability, but have generally focused on one-sided or overly
harsh results.137  One court, observing that contracts consist of
allocation of risks, concluded that a term within a contract is suspect
when it "reallocates the risks of the bargain in an objectively
unreasonable or unexpected manner.' 1 38 "The greater the unfair
surprise or inequality of bargaining power, the less unreasonable the
risk reallocation which will be tolerated.' 39 However, the 24 Hour
Fitness court chose to revert to the "traditional" definition of
substantive unconscionability: terms so harsh or oppressive as to
"shock the conscience. ' '14°
With these elements in mind, the court of appeal rejected
Munshaw's unconscionability claims.'4' Even assuming that
procedural unconscionability was present, the court found that
Munshaw had not shown any reason that the terms of the agreement
were harsh or oppressive. 42 The court compared the contract
between Munshaw and 24 Hour Fitness to the arbitration clause
sought to be enforced in Stirlen v. Supercuts. 43 In Stirlen, the terms of
the arbitration clause were found to be oppressively one-sided
because they limited the employees' rights in the arbitration process
while retaining those rights for the employer. 144 Because Munshaw
and 24 Hour Fitness shared equal rights under their arbitration
clause, the court found there was no substantive unconscionability. 145
Here, the court should have applied the broader standard for
determining substantive unconscionability used in A&M Produce
Co.,146 and compared the inequality in bargaining power to the risks
allocated by the contract. When the employee signs away her right to
settle in court a claim arising from her employment contract, she has
taken on a serious risk. The inequality in bargaining power,
acknowledged by the court,147 would carry more weight under this
standard. The heightened standard would require the court to look at
more than just the question whether both sides received the same
rights under the arbitration clause. Because 24 Hour Fitness drafted
137. See Stirlen, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 145.
138. A&M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114,122 (Ct. App. 1982).
139. Id
140. 24 Hour Fitness, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 541.
141. IL
142. Id.
143. See id
144. Stirlen, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 151.
145. 24 Hour Fitness, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 541.
146. See A&M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114,122 (Ct. App. 1982).
147. 24 Hour Fitness, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 541.
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the contract, they knew more about the terms of the clause than did
Munshaw. They knew it could apply to her fellow employees; they
knew it would protect them against her FEHA claims. Munshaw
merely knew that she needed to sign these documents in order to get
her paycheck.148 The inclusion of fellow employees as third party
beneficiaries and the possibility that she would end up without any
forum for her dispute significantly shifted the risk to Munshaw and
were clearly beyond her reasonable expectations from the language
of the contract.
MI. Should Workers Be Forced To Waive Their Civil Rights By
Signing Mandatory Arbitration Clauses?
The facts in 24 Hour Fitness are as moving as the result is unjust.
Not only was this plaintiff (allegedly, of course) subjected to the
extremely vile behavior of her fellow employees and supervisors, she
then met with more harassment and a cold shoulder when she turned
to the company for help. After leaving work under a constructive
discharge, she had the misfortune of hiring several attorneys who
appear to have a made a mess out of the most promising aspects of
her case. The glimmer of hope offered by the trial court's denial of
defendants' motion for summary judgment is dashed by the one-two
punch delivered by the court of appeal-first overruling the trial
court, then finding that plaintiff had also waived her right to
arbitration. As if things could get any worse, the case was dismissed
even as to the individual defendants based on facts alleged in
Munshaw's complaint! Sierra Munshaw's trip through the workplace
and the court system left her with a list of wrongs and not a single
remedy.
The implications of 24 Hour Fitness ring in a dark hour for
victims of employment discrimination. Prequently, at-will employees
will be unaware that they have signed an arbitration agreement as a
term of their employment until that fact arises as a defense to their
complaint against their employer. By that time, an employee's
behavior in attempting to litigate her claim on the merits may be
construed by the court as an implicit waiver of his rights under that
contract. The result will be that the employer is neither responsible
to defend in court nor participate in the contractual arbitration. This
is clearly advantageous to a defendant corporation, and devastating to
the interests of an employee. Another result of 24 Hour Fitness may
148. See id. at 544.
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be that employees who have signed arbitration agreements under
questionable circumstances, or with borderline-unconscionable terms,
will be completely discouraged from attempting to determine the
viability of the agreement in a courtroom. This result works to the
advantage of the corporation, who already had the ultimate benefit of
being the party with superior power and the drafter of the mandatory
terms of the contract.
These concerns become especially poignant in light of the 24
Hour Fitness court's ruling on third party beneficiaries to a
mandatory arbitration agreement between employer and employee.
Even assuming that the employee read, understood, and agreed to the
terms of an arbitration clause, there is no reason to impute knowledge
of the law of agency to a layperson employee. Unless the arbitration
agreement specifically states that fellow employees will have access to
the same right to compel arbitration as the employer, the employee-
signatory does not know that other employees will be the
beneficiaries of this contract. It is particularly repugnant, therefore,
to bar plaintiff's remedies against those fellow employees through
summary judgment and an implied-or even explicit-waiver of a
right to arbitrate against the employer.
The result of this case illustrates a clear example of the need for
change in cases involving mandatory arbitration clauses in
employment contracts. If the legislature were to take action, it could
clarify its intent regarding the relationship between arbitration
clauses and civil rights protections under FEHA. Employers could be
forced to endure stricter scrutiny when including arbitration clauses
in boilerplate employment contracts.149
Alternatively, the legislature could change the system for
everyone's benefit by engaging in an overhaul of the current
arbitration system. One approach would be to conceive of the
arbitrator as an "independent investigator" whose role in the
proceedings would be more akin to the judge under the civil law
system of courts. The investigator would conduct her own discovery
into the facts and have an increased ability to question the parties and
other witnesses. Finally, the investigator would ultimately produce an
149. The California Supreme Court recently clarified the elements essential to a valid
pre-dispute arbitration clause, when the arbitration clause includes statutory claims. It
must provide for neutral arbitrators, provide for more than minimal discovery, require a
written opinion allowing appellate review, allow all types of relief that would be available
in court, and not require employees to pay either unreasonable costs or any arbitrators'
fees or expenses. See generally Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs. Inc., 6 P.3d
669 (Cal. 2000).
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opinion that was subject to a broader scope of review than the current
standard governing arbitration review. This plan could have the
potential of curing several disadvantages frequently cited about the
current state of arbitration. Without affecting the benefits of the
present arbitration system-its speed and cost-effectiveness-a new
system could increase the attractiveness of arbitration to plaintiffs by
providing for more discovery as well as producing an opinion subject
to review. By adding some of the safeguards present in litigation,
plaintiffs will be more likely to achieve just results from arbitration.
The overall attractiveness of arbitration as an alternative to litigation
will be apparent to both plaintiffs and defendants, thus making
mandatory arbitration clauses less burdensome to plaintiffs.
Another solution lies with the California courts: 24 Hour Fitness
would have had a different result if the court had adopted the broader
standard of review for an unconscionability claim.150 Especially if
cases disputing arbitration clauses are to be thrown out on summary
judgment and deemed unarbitrable due to a plaintiff's waiver,
unconscionability is an argument of last resort for the plaintiff and
should accordingly be granted some additional deference by the
courts. Boilerplate employment contracts-signed as a "condition of
employment" by legally naive employees-are a fertile breeding
ground for genuine claims of unconscionability. Plaintiffs in litigation
as a result of these contracts should receive the benefit of the doubt,
in the form of California's broader standard of review.
The future of avoiding both litigation and arbitration of
employment discrimination claims looks rosy for employers in
California right now. However, the alternative of Duffield or
prohibitive legislation is a real enough possibility that potential
defendants would do well to embrace a middle ground promoting
plaintiffs rights in civil rights' cases while still protecting the freedom
of contracting parties.151  The statutory right to be free from
employment discrimination is the most obvious arena to scrutinize
any means by which an employer gains more power over its
150. See supra Part II, section C.
151. Although the facts are only somewhat related, the Supreme Court may shed some
light on the subject of pre-dispute employment clauses when it decides Circuit City Stores,
Inc. v. Adams, 194 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 146 L. Ed. 2d 955 (2000). This
case involves an employee bringing suit in federal court alleging sexual harassment,
discrimination and constructive discharge. The district court granted Circuit City's motion
to compel arbitration, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that employment disputes
did not fall under the Federal Arbitration Act. Id at 1071-72. Although the F.A.A. is not
at issue in 24 Hour Fitness, the Court might nevertheless clarify some of the issues
addressed in this Note.
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employees. Implicit and explicit in the text and legislative history of
FEHA is the need to protect employees from the misuse of an
employer's superior power, even where intent to prohibit mandatory
arbitration clauses cannot be inferred.
It is essential to create reliable standards wherein the terms of a
contract are enforced and the reasonable expectations of a
contracting party are protected. However, an equally essential
outcome is to assure equitable results for employees signing
arbitration agreements. A valid arbitration agreement should be
upheld by the court, but the validity of those agreements should
remain an issue for the courts to decide, without requiring plaintiffs to
make an all-or-nothing choice to find a remedy for their wrong.
** *
